First Glance: An Introductory Analysis of Network Forensics of Tor by Hansen, Raymond
Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law 2013 Proceedings 
Jun 11th, 3:50 PM 
First Glance: An Introductory Analysis of Network Forensics of Tor 
Raymond Hansen 
Department of Computer and Information Technology, Purdue University, hansenr@purdue.edu 
(c)ADFSL 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/adfsl 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Computer Law Commons, Electrical and Computer 
Engineering Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, and the Information Security 
Commons 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Hansen, Raymond, "First Glance: An Introductory Analysis of Network Forensics of Tor" (2013). Annual 
ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law. 1. 
https://commons.erau.edu/adfsl/2013/tuesday/1 
This Peer Reviewed Paper is brought to you for free and 
open access by the Conferences at Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Annual ADFSL 
Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law by an 
authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2013 
 
105 
FIRST GLANCE: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF 
NETWORK FORENSICS OF TOR 
Raymond Hansen 
Department of Computer and Information Technology 
Purdue University 
401 N. Grant Street 
West Lafayette, IN 47907-2021  
Phone: (765) 796-9482 
Fax: (765) 496-1212 
hansenr@purdue.edu 
ABSTRACT 
The Tor network is a low-latency overlay network for TCP flows that is designed to provide privacy 
and anonymity to its users. It is currently in use by many as a means to avoid censorship of both 
information to be shared and information to be retrieved. This paper details the architecture of the Tor 
network as a platform for evaluating the current state of forensic analysis of the Tor network. Specific 
attempts to block access to the Tor network are examined to identify (a) the processes utilized to 
identify Tor nodes, and (b) the resulting exposure of potentially inculpatory evidence. Additional 
known, but yet to be perpetrated, attacks are examined for a more holistic view of the state of forensics 
of the Tor network.  Based on the combination of these studies, there is some evidence that a specific, 
individual flow of traffic over the Tor network is attributable to a single entity. However, the content 
of that flow has not been compromised within the Tor network. As such, the inculpatory evidence 
required for legal action is limited at this time. 
Keywords: Tor, Forensic Analysis, Privacy & Anonymity 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Tor is a popular 2nd generation implementation of the onion routing topology (Tor, 2012). This 
topology was developed in work for the U.S. Navy Research Lab in the mid-1990s (Goldschlage, 
Reed, Syverson, 1996). This is an overlay network of the public Internet that is designed to provide 
online privacy and anonymity to its users through two different mechanisms. The first mechanism of 
privacy relies on multiple encryption iterations in order to obfuscate the entirety of traditional IP 
packets. The second mechanism relies on seemingly random network ingress points, routing hops, and 
egress points to diminish an external observer’s ability to identify the end-to-end path of a traffic flow 
through traffic analysis or network surveillance. 
Since Tor is designed to provide anonymity, it would be beneficial to have at least a rudimentary 
definition of anonymity.  One could simply say it is the state of being anonymous. But that seems 
circular in definition and is less than useful for any rigorous discussion. So, instead, anonymity could 
better be thought of as “the state of not being identifiable within a set of subjects” (Pfitzmann & 
Kohotopp, 2001, p.1). Even using this definition, there are still murky waters concerning attribution of 
the Tor flows to a particular entity.   
The anonymity provided by this network is intended to allow users to send and receive data across the 
network with little fear of being identified by an external observer, regardless of friend or foe status.  
Since this tool can be utilized by both the innocuous and nefarious with no immediate mechanism to 
distinguish between them, and the anonymity and privacy provided may afford the impetus for illicit 
online behavior, many governments and law enforcement agencies have become increasingly 
concerned with the operations of this network. Additionally, many nations wish to censor 
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communications both within and across their borders, including: Belarus, China, Cuba, North Korea, 
Syria, and more (Ho, 2009). In fact, recently, all encrypted traffic was blocked within Palestine 
(Ma’an News, 2012; York, 2012), all HTTPS traffic was blocked in Iran (Rezale, 2012), and access to 
Tor Directories and Bridges have been blocked by State-sponsored service providers (Tor Project, 
2009; Tor Project, 2010, etc.). For many citizens within these countries, access to Tor was a potential 
solution to this censorship, if they were able to access the network. As such, shortly after these denials 
of entrance to the Tor network, access to the nodes was restored by the semi-anonymous operators of 
the Tor network, much to the dismay of the State. 
Discussions of Tor Hidden Service nodes and client-side views of Tor are left for future work.  This 
paper focuses on the network-side attributes of Tor as well as the inculpatory and exculpatory 
evidence from the data communications and networking aspects of its operations. This view uses 
cybersecurity as the lens to focus this view. As such, this view is driven by the understanding that 
cybersecurity and digital forensic analysis are inextricably linked. These two are complementary, 
supplementary, and co-dependent. An analysis of the security processes gives way to the mechanisms 
that are useful for performing forensic analysis.   
This paper identifies types of uses and users of the Tor network which includes highlighting the 
history and operations of the Tor network while differentiating its operation from that of the traditional 
routing mechanisms in use on the public Internet. It then identifies known and executed “attacks” 
against the Tor network and provides details of their execution process(es). Utilizing previous State-
sponsored efforts, earlier successful forensic approaches are identified for the purpose of determining 
if unique individual flows were identified, or merely particular nodes and their aggregate traffics were 
determined to be participatory.  It will be shown in this paper that even though it might be possible to 
identify a particular flow of traffic, attribution to any individual is not provable through Tor network 
attributes. Yet, that correlation of traffic flow to a particular host device may be inculpatory enough 
for some jurisdictions. Next, known potential attacks against the Tor network are detailed.  It should 
be noted that while these are known potential attacks, there is not yet any proof that they have been.  
These are intended to provide a foundation to identify potential forensic analysis of operations of the 
Tor network. Lastly, we detail the potential evidentiary findings of a generic Tor node and any 
applicable inculpatory indicators therein. 
2. THE TOR ARCHITECTURE 
Tor is a 2nd generation implementation of the onion routing topology initially developed in work for 
the U.S. Navy Research Lab in the mid-1990s (Goldschlage, Reed, Syverson, 1996; Tor, 2012). This 
implementation of the onion routing topology is intended to be a low-latency overlay network for TCP 
flows over the public Internet that intends to provide privacy and anonymity to its users.  Specifically, 
Tor provides the functionality that “prevents a user from being linked with their communication 
partners” (Loesing, Murdoch, Dingledine, 204, 2010). 
While the original design goal of the Tor network was to provide significantly more privacy to a user 
than provided in default Internet communications, Tor has recently been used by evade state-
sponsored censorship attempts (Loesing, Murdoch, Dingledine, 2010).  Dingledine has noted that there 
is an “ongoing trend in law, policy, and technology” that “threaten anonymity… (and) undermine our 
ability to speak and read freely” on the public Internet (n.d.). For example, in early 2012, Iran 
disallowed access to any sites that utilized HTTPS (Kabir News, 2012). Also, in May, 2012, the 
Palestinian government shut down eight news websites for posting critical opinion pieces of the 
president (Hale; OONI, 2012). In mid-2012, the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation began 
performing deep packet inspection on all ingress and egress traffic coming in to the country. As 
Ethiopia’s only service provider, they had direct access to all such traffic (Runa, 2012). York has 
provided multiple cases where there have been calls for additional censorship, the creation of a 
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censorship body, and even examples where citizens have been arrested for political or religious 
reasons (2012b). And so then, Tor is intended to provide not only privacy in these types of scenarios, 
but anonymity by providing protection against eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks.  
Additionally, by using multiple iterations of encryption and intermediating nodes defining a radically 
different path from a client to its ultimate destination, deep packet inspection, traffic analysis, and 
timing analysis attempts are mitigated. 
2.1 Traditional Internetwork Routing 
In a traditional routing environment, each packet from a source is addressed with the ultimate address 
of the destination. A router will then examine the destination address, choose the best neighboring 
router based on the longest-match algorithm, and then forward the packet to that destination. Each 
router along the path from source to destination performs this action on every packet in a flow. This 
process, while resilient to the dynamic topology of the Internet, is inherently insecure.  This process 
potentially leaks information about both the source and destination of the flow, the content of the 
packets, as well as the path that is used to deliver these packet flows. As such, there is little inherent 
privacy, and no anonymity in the default routing process. 
A pair of options that were defined in the original IP standard for use in networks was loose source 
and record routing. These options allowed the source node of an IP packet to explicitly specify a 
partial, or complete, path for the packet to follow (RFC 791, 1981). Source-routing overrides the 
traditional routing process using the longest-match algorithm to search the routing table that occurs on 
each router in a path. Instead, the packet is routed along the destinations listed in the source-route 
contained in the IP packet header.  This approach to routing a packet through the network relies on the 
assumption that the source of the IP packet has a complete view of the network topology to the 
ultimate destination and can provide explicit path information in the packet.  By specifying each hop 
from the source to destination, or minimally at least one intervening hop, a “trusted” path can be used 
to deliver packets.  Yet, even though the path may be “trusted”, this IP options approach provides no 
additional security of the packet; neither is there additional privacy, confidentiality, or integrity of the 
packet using this approach. Further, the source and destination node addresses are still directly 
readable by any passive monitor in this path. Extending this concept, the use of this IP option could 
potentially be used to reduce privacy by exposing known “trusted” nodes in the path to additional 
scrutiny by any interested party. Because of this, most routers on the public Internet ignore the path 
specified by a host with this option or discard the packet altogether (Zwicky, Cooper, and Chapman, 
2000). 
Enhancements and additions have been made to attempt to add privacy to this original routing process.  
Encryption, in the form of SSL and TLS, has been added to secure the payload of each packet from 
inspection (intrusion) by outside parties. However, this approach does nothing to obfuscate the source 
or destination of the flow.  Also, simply encrypting the payload still allows traffic analysis and timing 
analysis to occur and potentially identify the type of payload being transacted even though the exact 
payload is not identified. Other encryption approaches have been added to this process to further 
obfuscate the packet payload through the use of IPsec, which encrypts the IP packet payload. This 
approach hides the TCP or UDP port numbers, which makes protocol identification more difficult, but 
not impossible. Traffic analysis and timing analysis are still possible, as well as the immediate 
identification of the source and destination IP address information for the source and destination 
nodes. This is perhaps better recognized as providing integrity and confidentiality of the payload, not 
privacy or anonymity. 
An additional implementation of IPsec allows for full encapsulation and encryption of the entire 
packet. This is referred to as Tunnel-Mode. In this implementation of IPsec, the packet is fully 
encrypted and then encapsulated within another packet. This new packet typically will have different 
source and destination IP addresses than that of the encapsulated packet. These new IP addresses are 
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the end points of a VPN tunnel. Each router along the path from the new source address to the new 
destination address passes the encapsulated packet with no knowledge of the original source and 
destination IP address. This approach provides some privacy for the packet flow, as an external 
observer will have difficulty identifying the payload information. However, the VPN end points are 
still fully capable of examining the payload and identifying the communicating participants.  
2.2 Routing in the Tor Network 
The Tor network is based on the original onion routing architecture described in Hiding Routing 
Information by Goldschlag, Reed, and Syverson (1996). The Tor network, while being based on the 
original onion routing architecture, has deviated from and enhanced significantly in operation.  There 
are three defined connection-establishment processes for Tor (Dingledine, Mathewson, n.d.). This 
paper focuses on the most recent of those processes (v3). 
A rudimentary understanding of the architectural components is critical to the discussion of the Tor 
network.  So, a short description of the major components of the Tor network is included here: 
 Bridge (Bridge Relay) – A Tor Relay that does not report to the Tor Directories and can 
only be reached through knowledge of their location on existing networks. These nodes 
are used to circumvent filtering techniques against known Relays. 
 Circuit – The onion router path from a Host through a public internetwork to a subset of 
Relays that requires a unique set of encryption between the host and each Relay in the 
path. Routing of packets between the Host and each ordered Relay is handled with the 
traditional packet forwarding mechanism by the routers within the public internetwork. 
 Directory – One of a set of Tor nodes that collect, verify, format, and disseminate Relay 
status information throughout the Tor network. 
 Host – The source node in the Tor network that runs the Tor software proxy, initiates 
circuit construction, and passes data through a local SOCKS proxy into circuits for 
traversal over the encrypted paths. 
 Mix – The combination of Relays provided by a Directory that a Host will use to establish 
a Circuit. 
 Relay – A node in the Tor network that acts as a circuit routing device.  This node 
responds to circuit construction requests by establishing an encrypted channel between 
itself and host. These node forwards packets based on the Circuit ID contained in the Tor 
packet header. Availability and capacity of this node are reported to the Tor Directories. 
In order for the Tor network to be able to process any connections, each of the Relays must report their 
availability to a set of Directories. This is shown in Figure 1 below. Each of the Relays reports their 
name, exit policy, available capacity, and other defined information to the Directories, which then 
verify the reported capacity and utilize a voting process to establish a network consensus document for 
distribution to Hosts (Tor Directory Protocol, version 3, 2012). 












Figure 1 Relay Registration 
Hosts must learn of the available Relays by periodically contacting a hard-coded Directory from a set 
of Directories, as shown in Figure 2.  This connection is actually established over a single-hop onion 
route to obfuscate the source Host from the Directory.  The Directory will respond with a consensus 
document to the requesting Host, which will then determine the mix of Relays to be used to establish 










Figure 2 Mix Request & Response 
Based on the mix derived by the Host from the previous steps, the Host will iteratively build an onion 
route a single Relay at a time, choosing the exit Relay first.  This Relay is selected based on it having 
an acceptable exit policy and then the remaining Relays are pseudorandomly chosen (Dingledine & 
Matthewson, 2012).  The host will initiate the first layer in the onion route to the initial Relay using 
the Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Key Exchange to establish a TLS connection based on those derived 
keys, as seen in Figure 3, using preferred ciphersuites such as 
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_DHE-RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, and 
SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (Dingledine & Matthewson, 2012).  Then, the Host 
sends a Tor specific command (CREATE) to indicate a new circuit is needed.  The Relay (Relay A) 
will respond with a CREATED command if successful.  The first layer of the onion route has then 
been created and is uniquely identified by a CircuitID that is meaningful only between the Host and 
Relay. Traditional routing processes will still occur to determine the path between the Host and the 
first Relay, and vice versa, in the onion route. 













Figure 3 Building Channel to Relay A 
The Host will then extend the circuit established in the previous step by negotiating the second layer 
of the onion route with the second Relay (Relay B). Again, the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange is used 
to establish shared keys for the TLS connection, as seen in Figure 4. The Host sends an EXTEND 
command to Relay A, encrypted using the shared keys of Host-Relay A, which then forwards the 
content to Relay B.  That content is a CREATE command for Relay B and is encrypted with the Host-
Relay B keys. This then establishes the second layer of the onion route circuit. So, the host now 
manages two shared keys, one for each of the Relays that it has established connections with to build a 
circuit. The first layer of the circuit (Relay A) is unable to observe the content of the cells that flow 











Figure 4 Extending Channel to Relay B 
The onion route has one additional layer added to it through the use of a third Relay (Relay C). The 
same process is used to extend the circuit as in the previous steps, with an additional round of 
encryption occurring for the newly established connection between the Host and Relay C that traverses 
both Relay A and Relay B, as shown in Figure 5. Relay A and Relay B both process an EXTEND 
command, while Relay C processes a CREATE command. At this point, the onion route is complete.  
A Host now has an anonymized connection through the public Internet. 













Figure 5 Extending Channel to Relay C 
Using this established onion route, the Host can interact with any public resource as seen in Figure 6 
by using the RELAY commands within the cell to be routed. Relay C will perform all DNS queries on 
behalf of the Host so as to limit any monitoring of the Host in an attempt to identify specific 
destinations or resources that are being accessed. In this way, each node in the path (initiating client, 
Relays, and destination device) only knows the identity of its immediately adjacent neighbors 
(Dingledine et al, 2004). It should be note, however, that simply using the onion route doesn’t provide 
any protection of the data flowing between Relay C and the destination. In fact, monitoring traffic at 
an exit node is one of the viable methods for attempting to identify users of the Tor network. So, any 
unencrypted traffic between the exit node (Relay C) and the destination can be observed, recorded, 









Figure 6 Anonymous Communication via Tor 
A Host does not use, or maintain only a single onion route. In fact, it regularly constructs and 
terminates circuits in a timely manner. That is, a Tor Host may initiate a new circuit a frequently as 
once per minute, and will terminate an unused circuit every five minutes. Most circuits are terminated 
after less than ten minutes of use as a mechanism to reduce traffic analysis attacks against the network 
and those using the network. A simple example of the diversity of connections maintained by a Host 
can be seen in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Multiple Distinct Concurrent Channels from Host 
So then, this approach to obfuscating data provides anonymity of the source, as only the Directory and 
first Relay know the identity of the initiating client and not the identity of the destination. The 
remaining Relays will not know the identity of the initiating client.  Only the exit Relay (Relay C) will 
know the identity of the destination. 
3. CURRENT TOR NETWORK ATTACKS 
There are many well-known mechanisms that can be used to censor materials on the Internet.  These 
have ranged from simple source/destination IP address filtering, DNS filtering/injection/hijacking, as 
well as content filtering (Ho, 2009). However, these approaches assume a user with little expectation 
of privacy or anonymity. If a user utilizes encryption or other obfuscation approaches, then these 
censoring tasks become more difficult.  This is the intent of those utilizing the Tor network for access 
to resources on the Internet – make difficult the analysis of their traffic content and its characteristics 
through encryption and anonymizing services. So then, for authorities to keep pace with the censorship 
of content flowing over the Tor network, they must also attempt to censor the utilization of this 
network. 
Previously, performing deep packet inspection by a state-owned service provider would provide 
complete access to the traffic being sent or received by any user. At any ingress/egress point of the 
network, analysis could take place through a legal (or illegal) wiretap or other intercept process. The 
network could even be designed to have several “chokepoints” where this analysis could be expedited.  
Even if non-typical protocols were implemented by privacy- and anonymity-seeking users, digital 
fingerprinting and traffic analysis would typically be sufficient to identify potentially “dangerous” 
network traffic. However, the Tor network significantly, and sometimes dramatically, complicates this 
process for state-sponsored filtering. 
As nation-states attempt to quell access to the Tor network, opposing actions have been taken to 
restore anonymous capabilities. The following is a partial listing that highlights a subset of current 
“attacks” against Tor (the service), the Tor network components, and the corresponding responses by 
Tor maintainers to circumvent these censorship attempts. 
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In September, 2011, Iran blocked access to the Tor network by adding a filtering rule to their national 
border routers. This rule specifically identified Tor traffic and filtered this traffic while still passing all 
other traffic that was not previously blocked. This filter identified a specific component of the traffic 
flow that established the Tor connections. Tor is designed to make all network traffic appear that of a 
client accessing an HTTPS web server. As such, this requires a secure handshake process.  It was this 
handshake process that was uniquely identified by the Iranian government. The SSL session certificate 
expiration time on Tor Relays was set to two hours, which is uncharacteristic of certificates issued 
from a real, public certificate authority. The resolution, which was implemented the same day by Tor 
engineers, was to lengthen the expiration time of the Relay certificates to more closely emulate that of 
a true SSL certificate implementation (Tor, 2012). 
The standard connection initiation process involves a client requesting a listing of Relays from a 
Directory. These Directories are statically coded in the Tor client, meaning they are directly known by 
any party using, or monitoring, Tor. Because of this, the Chinese government simply blocked access to 
the IP addresses of each of those known Directories, effectively eliminating a client’s ability to 
establish a connection into the Tor network (Lewman, 2009). Prior to this event in 2009, the Tor 
developers added functionality to the Tor architecture to resolve the potential of this vulnerability 
being exploited. The resolution to this vulnerability was the addition of Bridges into the Tor 
architecture. A Bridge functions just like a Tor Relay, but is not registered in the public Directory 
servers and is used as the first (entry) or last (exit) Relay in the path So then, a Tor client must learn of 
these Bridge locations (addresses) by some other means. This is accomplished by using the graphical 
interface to Tor, Vidalia, or by manually configuring the Bridge IP addresses into the Tor client after 
retrieving the information from the Tor website. Considering that both of these approaches are likely 
filtered by any entity blocking access to Directories and Relays, an email option is also available.  (Tor 
Projects, 2012). This architectural adaptation effectively circumvented the blocking of Directories and 
Relays. 
In late-2011, the Chinese government began blocking access to Bridges within China. Analysis of the 
blocking actions revealed that connections were initially allowed, but were terminated within a matter 
of minutes (Wilde, 2012). Further analysis showed that filtering process was performing a passive 
fingerprint analysis of the communications between a host and the Bridge and then attempted to 
establish an active connection to the Bridge. It was determined that an identifiable client-side 
parameter of the SSL negotiation was unique to the communications of hosts to Tor Bridges. The 
intensity of the active scans suggested near line rate deep packet inspection, which requires significant 
processing capabilities (Wilde, 2012).  This type of scanning lasted for only a few short weeks before 
it was abruptly terminated (Wilde, 2012). But, was apparently active again in March, 2012 when 
additional evaluation was performed (Winter and Lindskog, 2012). This attack is further mitigated in 
the most current handshake negotiation process, as TLS has supplanted SSL, and the parameter in the 
SSL/TLS cipher list that was uniquely identifiable has thus been removed (Wilde, 2012). 
Not long after the Chinese government identified the client-side cipher list issue to block access to 
Bridges, the Kazakh government also began blocking access to Bridges within Kazakhstan (Lewman, 
2012). Again, unpublished Bridges were being identified through continual deep packet inspection.  
Until this time, Relays were not blocked within the country and Tor was used somewhat extensively.  
Analysis of traffic arriving at the Bridges suggested no active scans, as the Chinese government had 
undertaken. However, it was determined that the passive scans of deep packet inspection have 
identified a unique parameter of the server-side hello message in the TLS negotiation. An additional 
tool, called obfsproxy, while not directly part of the Tor architecture, continued to function within the 
country during this time (Lewman, 2012). Thus, allowing citizens anonymized access to the Internet.  
As of this writing, no resolution to this filtering approach was found.  
In the Bad Apple Attack an insecure application, such as a web browser, used over Tor is capable of 
revealing the Host’s IP address thorough information leaking via Flash, Java, JavaScript, etc. In this 
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case, they exploited a BitTorrent application. By leaking this information, there is the potential to be 
able to attribute particular quantities and patterns of packets to the source as member packets of this 
flow. By leaking this information, all other flows from that host could be considered suspect (Le 
Blond et. al., 2011). 
Many more attacks against Tor can be found by browsing the Tor blogs and brief Internet searches.  
With the recent political unrest in Egypt, Syria, Libya, and more, there are moribund examples of 
State-sponsored censorship attempts. Interestingly, censorship is not necessarily only occurring 
locations of political upheaval. Access to the Tor website is blocked by non-government controlled 
cellular providers in both the UK and US (Tor, 2012). 
4. PROPOSED TOR NETWORK ATTACKS 
In addition to the many existing and perpetrated attacks that have already transpired against the Tor 
network, there are multiple theoretical attacks that have been described by the Tor developers. This 
section briefly describes some of those attacks as a means to discover Bridges and Relays and 
subsequently use them an attack launching point to (a) discover the topology of the Tor network; (b) 
break anonymity of the Tor user (profiling, timing, or traffic analysis); or (c) block access to the Tor 
network (Tor, 2011a; Tor, 2011b).   
Many of these described attacks by the Tor developers and maintainers center on a nefarious party 
passively monitoring connections through an observation point within the Tor path. A more active 
version of this is to have the attacker actually participate in the Tor network as a Bridge, Relay, Guard, 
or even client.  Both of these approaches allow the timing and traffic analysis attacks to be performed 
against a Tor user in such a manner that most Tor users would not recognize any analysis was 
occurring. Other approaches are more active in their style; including port scans, issuing malformed 
connection requests, and spoofing messages between Tor nodes. Combinations of these attacks may be 
performed to be more discriminating in actions against network users. That is, they may be 
concentrated in a more targeted manner to reduce collateral damage within the network. 
Additional attacks have been proposed by Feamster and Dingledine (2004); Murdoch and Danezis 
(2005); and Dingledine and Murdoch (2009). Each of the scenarios described in these papers seek to 
perform traffic analysis and timing attacks. That is, attribution of a flow of traffic to a particular 
location within the network at a specific moment in time.  The content of these flows were not 
exposed in these scenarios. 
Other attacks over the Tor network have been performed that have specifically identified the actual 
source’s IP address, hostname, time zone settings, and Internet browser type and version by exposing 
weaknesses in the applications that use Tor (Christensen, 2006a; Christensen, 2006b). Alternatively, 
an additional side-channel attack has been proposed by Shebaro (2012) in which a unique, identifiable, 
binary string is written to a client from a controlled or compromised destination; leaving the client 
potentially identifiable–eliminating privacy and anonymity upon investigation. That is, users have 
expected Tor to provide privacy and anonymity of their web browsing, yet their browsing habits 
allowed their anonymity to be compromised. 
5. EVIDENTIARY ANALYSIS 
Tor is not a panacea for all network related censorship issues. Tor can’t solve complete network 
blackouts or shutdowns, as in Syria in late 2012 (Renesys, 2012). There must be connectivity in place 
for Tor to utilize. Without a network path, Tor is as powerless as any other connection tool; 
anonymizing or otherwise. With that being said, this section will analyze the potential for identifying 
inculpatory evidence within the Tor network for the purpose of some action being taken by law 
enforcement agencies (LEA). 
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Each of the perpetrated and proposed attacks has little forensic value at first pass. The value of these 
attacks, when successful, is in the transparent monitoring capabilities that a State or LEA may have 
that would subsequently allow direct correlation of inculpatory evidence to a specific network host.  
This approach from a state-sponsored attack is highly reliant on their ability to track or trace a 
particular data flow. This ability to correlate a flow to a particular host is dependent on the ability to 
actually capture those flows. This is directly related to the number of egress (and by extension, 
ingress) points to those networks. An analysis of the number of connection points into and out of a 
nation has been performed by Renesys in order to determine the likelihood of a complete blackout 
occurring similar to the Syria 2012 incident (Forbes, 2012). An alternate view of this data could be 
taken that a state may not wish to fully disconnect their citizens from the Internet. Instead, these 
connection points can become the capture, and correlation points for their monitoring systems; 
thereby, providing a State an evidence-gathering facility directly in the network path. 
5.1 Analysis 
To date, there are no known attempts to break the encryption algorithms used specifically attributable 
to the Tor network. That is, all known attempts at obstructing access to the Tor network, or identifying 
a user of the Tor network rely on attacking the architectural components or passive observation of 
traffic over the Tor network. As seen in Lewman (2009, 2012); Tor (2011a, 2011b); and Wilde (2012), 
it is possible to identify the role(s) a particular node is performing in the Tor network. When a 
connection is established, it is possible to determine which device is the client by identifying the TLS 
“Client Hello” portion of the encryption exchange. Likewise, Wilde showed that Bridges are identified 
in China and Kazakhstan through the TLS “Server Hello” messages within the encryption exchange.  
So then, we know directly that there are certain identifiable characteristics attributable to each role 
within the Tor architecture. This has been discussed further in Tor (2011a) as a code implementation 
and auditing issue.   
It may be possible to identify traffic flows through the Tor network without knowing the location of 
Tor Relays, Bridges, or hosts. Tor specifies a cell size of 512 bytes. As such, it may be possible to 
examine flows for multiple consecutive packets around this size, as it may indicate a Tor flow is 
present. This pattern of packets will differ from that of a typical web transaction, where many 
consecutive packets are sized at the MTU and only the last packet will be smaller than the MTU. This 
is one example of the many different traffic and timing analysis attacks that could be utilized to 
identify Tor traffic. Yet, this analysis doesn’t reveal the exact contents of the packets traversing the 
Tor network.  Specific patterns of Tor cells may reveal the obfuscated protocol(s) and thereby types of 
traffic. However, no content is directly leaked out of the Tor network in any of the approaches.  
Anonymity is compromised via correlation of these flows to potential traffic patterns of known flows, 
or templates of flows.   
5.2 Inculpatory Approaches 
What, if any, evidence is available to prove participation with the Tor network?  Many nations that are 
actively pursuing censorship of their population typically wish to identify those that are evading the 
systems in place that block or otherwise restrict access to the censored content. In identifying those 
persons, there is the potential for legal action, if there is inculpatory evidence. We have shown that 
many current nations that are blocking access to the Tor network are not yet actively pursuing the 
participants for legal action.  Yet, that is not to say that they will not do so in the future. 
It has been suggested that a LEA wishing to identify inculpatory evidence should host its own exit 
Relay within the Tor network and then actively perform traffic and timing analysis on the traffic as it 
exits and any response traffic that is generated (Schneier, 2008). Additionally, they could perform 
deep packet inspection on the traffic as it leaves the network, as the traffic will no longer be encrypted 
using the Tor network’s layers of encryption. In this way, any unencrypted traffic would reveal the 
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actual payload sent by the anonymous client.  The difficulty with this approach is that a Tor client will 
use a single channel for a single flow for no more than five minutes, by default. So, if the flow is 
longstanding, hosting an exit node will only account for a portion of that flow. 
As seen in the prior section, there are many proposed attack methods intended to circumvent 
anonymity in Tor. As of this writing, there are no known successful attacks on the actual underlying 
encryption standards used within Tor. However, it has been known for some time that the 
vulnerabilities of encryption reside in potentially poor implementation of the encryption protocols and 
standards, not the protocols themselves (Schneier, 1998). As such, this paper will not spend any 
additional efforts to describe encryption circumvention attempts. 
So then, based on the known executed attacks and potential attacks, what is the state of inculpatory 
discovery attempts? There are many denial of service attacks, as seen by the Chinese, Kazakh, and 
Iranian examples (Lewman, 2009; Lewman, 2012; Wilde, 2012). However, these do not provide any 
inculpatory material for an investigator as the client’s identity has not been determined in any of these 
cases.  That is, only access to the Tor Directory Service has been limited (Winter and Lindskog, 2012). 
Additional efforts are required to specifically identify the location and identity of the client in order to 
gain inculpatory evidence, depending on jurisdiction. 
Other investigative efforts have been performed and identified that a direct attack of the Tor protocol 
and architecture is not the best means of identifying the users of the anonymizing service (Christensen, 
2006a). Instead, attacks and manipulation of the application layer services being delivered over the 
Tor network are a much better means of determining Tor users (Christensen, 2006b; Fleischer, 2009).   
Additionally, a LEA may wish to establish a mechanism for additional inculpatory evidence to 
elimination potentially indefensible scenarios. Exploiting the clients and services within this network 
could allow a LEA to place a unique “key” on a host under investigation, assuming they control part 
of the network, or a service requested by the client. Shebaro (2010) has proposed a mechanism by 
which a unique and recoverable bit pattern can be placed onto a host over the period of ~30 minutes 
with little possibility of timing analysis revealing its transmission. 
Is Exculpatory evidence present or even feasible? As evidence may be present from other “regular” 
web browsing and file handling, specifics about exculpatory evidence are not explicit in this study.  
Understanding that there are differing thresholds for inculpatory evidence inclusion in any 
examination is critical (Loesing, Murdoch, Dingledine, 2010). In fact, there are hints of mere 
proposition of inculpatory evidence being sufficient to incarcerate or otherwise persecute individuals. 
(Hale, 2012). 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The Tor network was devise and deployed as a low-latency anonymity-providing overlay network for 
TCP flows.  It is implemented in a manner so that no node within the network can identify a complete 
flow through the network. A node is only capable of communicating with directly adjacent Tor nodes, 
even though they require potentially significant standard routing processes to connect those two 
adjacent nodes. This anonymity-providing network is now in use by those simply wishing to obfuscate 
their traffic from any potential observers as well as by those actively attempting to circumvent 
censorship. Because of this, those entities advocating censorship actively wish to maintain the 
censorship by eliminating the means used to evade it.  
Traffic analysis of Tor nodes operating in a known infrastructure currently provides little inculpatory 
evidence without significant efforts to capture traffic at ingress and egress of multiple points of the 
network. Correlating this analysis to individual hosts on the Internet in a reliable and defensible 
manner poses a daunting challenge. Yet, this is, to date, the only executable attack against the Tor 
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network that attempt to determine “what” an individual flow might contain. The encryption methods 
used within Tor have not been circumvented. So, the raw payload of the traffic is not viewable. 
There are potential attack points with the Tor architecture and the protocols implemented. Some, of 
which, have already been executed. However, these are not trivial exercises to perform or leverage 
these attacks. The more likely approach to breach the Tor network is to attempt to expose the identity 
of the users via exploitation of the weak (in terms of security) implementations of application-layer 
protocols and services that directly interact with those protocols.  
Inculpatory evidence from the Tor network is difficult to obtain for most nation-states and their law 
enforcement agencies. Simple monitoring of existing Tor nodes will not directly reveal the types of 
traffic contained in the flows that passed, nor will any Tor node know the complete path that the flow 
is taking. Even if an agency were to implement a Tor Relay or Bridge and monitor connections to it, 
significant man-power and technical expertise is required to maintain and monitor these nodes for the 
purpose of ultimately reporting analyses on traffic behaviors. This is an implausible scenario for all 
but the largest of LEAs… typically those that are state-sponsored. 
By looking at each individual component of the Tor network, the significance and amount of effort 
required to begin these attacks or analysis of the attacks can be seen. Beginning with inculpatory 
Analysis at a Directory–Since no user application data is sent to, passed through, or retrieved from the 
Directory there is little chance of inculpatory evidence. Also, since no single directory is authoritative 
for the state of all Relays in the Tor network there is no single point of attack, meaning also that there 
is no single point for investigation. As there is a voting process between all Tor Directories that 
establishes an agreed upon state of each Relay and publishes to all requesting Hosts as a network 
consensus document there could be the potential for learning some capability information of each 
Relay. But, this process is handled over encrypted links between each Directory and the Directory and 
Host. Additionally, there is no Directory discovery process for Hosts or Relays. Instead, the 
Directories are coded within the Tor toolset currently.  So, all communications with a directory are 
encrypted. However, if this information is needed, it is not private information to the Tor network.  A 
simple query to a Directory will result in the current network consensus document. This may have 
little inculpatory (or exculpatory) value unless it can be obtained during a specific monitoring period, 
as the document is updated on an ongoing basis. 
Inculpatory Analysis at Entry node (Relay) – As shown in many of the insecure application attacks, 
the Onion Proxy (Host) can potentially be identified as the source of a flow of traffic. But, after the 
secure onion router circuit is established, traffic & timing analysis are the only viable methods, which 
is not significant in many cases, as attribution is significantly difficult.   
Inculpatory Analysis at Intermediate relay – An intermediate (second) Relay in the onion routed path 
cannot identify source or destination without significant effort. This would require capabilities to 
monitor all relays in the onion route path in addition to performing traffic and timing analysis. This 
only provides the capabilities to perform attribution of ingress flows to egress flows with an uncertain 
level of probability. So then, only directly adjacent relays are known, and all communications along 
that channel segment are encrypted multiple times. 
7. FUTURE WORK 
While the forensic analysis that was briefly surveyed here shows little current inculpatory evidence is 
available by monitoring, and even participating in, the Tor network, there is significant interest in 
further evading detection of the Tor network. Some have proposed a censorship-detection add-on to 
the Tor network, while others are concentrating on continuing to push for the maturation of Tor.  
Extending the idea that Tor is a privacy- and anonymity-enhancing tool, and that those that block and 
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monitor Tor do so out of a desire to limit access to some resource, there are efforts required to define 
anti-forensic mechanisms within the Tor network. 
Lastly, the mixes of Relays that are provide to the Tor client to establish circuits and connections are 
in need of more research. First, a thorough evaluation of the allocation policy and its potential to leak 
location or other identity information could be performed. Next, it has been suggested that even 
though multiple Relays are returned in a mix and are thought to be geographically diverse, they may 
still be part of the same administrative domain (BGP ASNs). There has been some effort to alleviate 
this, as no two Relays within the same /16 CIDR block will be selected in the same circuit.  But, there 
has been no definitive proof that this is sufficient. So, it should be determined if this is indeed the case 
en masse, or as the outlier. To protect against such a situation, it is suggested that a module be added 
to the Tor Directory that documents the correlation between destination IP addresses and the BGP 
autonomous system in which those destinations reside. The ultimate purpose of this module will be to 
ensure that a mix provided by the Directory does not contain Relays from the same, or adjacent, ASes. 
Further, there are additional architectural implementations of Tor that provide hidden services, where 
dual-party anonymity is possible. Additional efforts are needed to determine the state of forensics on 
those particular architectures and the services available over Tor network in this hidden nature.  
Identification of services offered and how they are processed through the Tor network with respect to 
the “standard” delivery of those services is of some interest. 
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